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Abstract 
This paper shows that the way in which loan contract conditions are established by 
development institutions in rural credit markets shifts risks, from one sector (the targeted 
group of loan beneficiaries) to another (the specialized lender, the government, or an 
international donor). The paper shows that these risk-shifting properties of rural credit 
programs create negative incentives, that stimulate targeted borrowers not only to invest in 
more risky activities than otherwise and to increase the leverage debt financing of their 
investment projects, but to reduce the effort devoted to their productive activities as well. 
Those conditions imply free options and subsidies and create incentives for loan default. 
Thus, rural credit programs in developing countries are characterized by excessive riskiness, 
excess demands for loans, and low borrowers' productive efforts. The paper uses option 
pricing in a valuation model designed to examine these issues and it estimates the value of 
the implicit subsidy received by a sample of borrowers of the Agricultural Development 
Bank in the Dominican Republic during 1987. Loans granted with funds from more 
restrictive sources (targeting) experienced higher default rates and thus resulted in higher 
implicit subsidies. 
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I. Introduction 
Over the past few decades, governments in developing countries and international 
donors have emphasized the importance of formal rural credit as an instrument to acceler-
ate the growth of agricultural output and to improve rural income distribution. The strategy 
has primarily consisted of creating specialized agricultural lending institutions (SLis), to 
provide targeted rural producers with loans at favorable contract conditions, in advance of 
demand (Patrick, 1966). 
The way in which loan contract conditions are usually structured, however, frequently 
fails to explicitly consider the fact that agricultural credit has the potential to shift risks from 
one sector (the targeted group of beneficiaries) to another (the SLI, the government, or an 
international donor). Typically, the contract conditions offered by SLis to targeted 
borrowers allow them to provide the future crop as collateral, according to the following 
deal: if either crop yields or prices are too low, resulting in revenues below the amount to 
be repaid, the specialized agricultural lender would implement various special measures, 
which can range from direct cash subsidies, to the rescheduling of debts or even the outright 
forgiveness of the loans. Thus, the targeted borrowers appropriate for themselves all of the 
benefits during high-return years and the SLI or the government subsidize them during the 
low return years. 
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These risk-shifting properties of formal rural credit are often ignored by the agricul-
tural credit literature in the analysis of loan repayment problems. The main objective of 
this paper is two-fold. First, it attempts to analyze how the risk-shifting properties of rural 
credit affect the loan repayment performance of targeted agricultural borrowers. It argues 
that the loan contract conditions established by SLis have free options or implicit subsidies 
embeded in them that favor targeted agricultural borrowers and that these options create 
negative incentives for borrowers, thereby establishing the basis for the loan repayment 
problems faced by SLis. Second, the paper estimates the value of the implicit subsidy 
received by a sample of borrowers of the Agricultural Development Bank {BAG RI COLA) 
of the Dominican Republic during 1987. 
II. The Theoretical Valuation Model 
The economics literature has recognized the fact that many investment and financing 
decisions actually have options embeded in them.1 It has been argued that bank managers 
and policymakers are, without knowing it, constantly creating and evaluating options. In 
particular, Montiel [1983] has argued that whenever governments of developing countries 
force specialized agricultural lenders to act as generous financial intermediaries, they create 
options. Suppose, for example, a typical specialized agricultural lender that not only offers 
targeted borrowers $1,000 agricultural loans, at 10 percent interest, but the following deal 
as well: if the gross revenue from the crop is above $1, 100 (equivalent to the price of the 
1 For an extensive analysis of the theory and empirical research in option pricing see 
Brenner [1983], Mellor [1973], among others. 
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stock by the end of the harvest), the borrower would pay the bank the amount promised and 
pocket the difference. If the gross revenue is below $1,100, the bank would take the crop 
and forgive the difference. It is as if the lender offered the targeted borrower the right (or 
the free option) to sell the crop for a minimum fixed price, equal to the total loan obligation. 
In other words, the borrower is essentially receiving a free put option (or loan subsidy) with 
an exercise or striking price equal to the promised payment to the bank of $1,100. The 
question this paper addresses is how to determine the value of this subsidy. 
Valuing Contingent Claims 
Black and Scholes [1973) have shown that if a minimum set of assumptions are met,2 
the value of a put option (or contingent claim) can be estimated with knowledge only of the 
riskiness of the underlying asset (proxied by the risk of loan default); the value of the asset 
(the gross return of the crop), the risk-free interest rate, the time to maturity of the claim 
(the loan term), and the exercise price of the claim (the loan obligation). That is: 
(1) 
where 
2 The ideal conditions assumed by Black and Schole are the following: (1) the interest 
rate is known with certainty; (2) the distribution of possible stock prices at the end 
of the period is log-normal; (3) the option is "European", that is, it can only be 
exercised at maturity; (4) there are no transaction costs in selling or buying the 
option. 
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(2) 
(3) 
P is the value of the subsidy (or free put option) that targeted borrowers receive from the 
SLis; <I>( d) is the cumulative normal density function; V 0 is the estimated gross revenue of 
the crop at the moment of requesting the loan (the stock price); L is the value of the 
financial obligation at harvest (the exercise price); tis the time to harvest (or maturity); a2 
is the variance of the rate of return of the crop output; r is the continuously compounded 
risk free rate of interest; and In stand for natural logarithm. 
Three important propositions follow from expression (1). 
1. The value of the subsidy that targeted borrowers receive increases with the increasing 
risk of the returns on the crop. 
2. The value of the subsidy increases with an increasing loan obligation. 
3. The value of the subsidy decreases with an increasing expected value of the crop. 
Proposition (1) follows from the fact that 
~ In( Vo)+t[r-02/2]) ft _!_ = ie-rt L _t > O 
002 aft 2a 
(4) 
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One implication is that riskier projects yield a higher expected profit for borrowers and a 
lower one for the SLI than otherwise.3 The logic behind this proposition is that the 
targeted borrowers obtain a floor on the return of their investment projects, but receive all 
the return (after loan obligation) in good crop years, while the specialized agricultural 
lender or the government take all the losses during bad crop years. In other words, 
borrowers have a distribution of investment project returns truncated to the left. They have 
everything to gain and nothing to lose by increasing the variance of this distribution. 
Proposition (2) follows from the fact that 
[ ln( Vo) +t[r- a
2/2]] 
ap _ -rt .i.. L -rt > o 
- - -e "' +e 
aL aft 
(5) 
Since the borrowers have a guaranteed floor on the returns of their investment 
projects, they have everything to gain by increasing the leveraged debt financing of their 
activities. The higher the degree of leverage, which in this case acts as the strike price, the 
higher the probability that the put option will be enforced. 
Finally, proposition (3) follows from the fact that 
~ ln( Vo) + t[r - a2/2] J _aP_ = __ L____ - l < O 
avo aft 
(6) 
The economic interpretation of proposition (3) is that a high-return investment project will 
require increasing borrower's effort. With decreasing marginal returns to this effort 
(Clemenz, 1986), borrowers will not benefit by increasing their effort beyond some optimal 
3Riskiness is defined in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz [1970]. 
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level. This proposition implies that borrowers will devote less effort to their productive 
activities than will be required in investement projects with higher returns, in order to 
protect the lender's interests. 
In sum, the way in which loan contract conditions are established in formal rural 
credit markets estimulates targeted borrowers not only to invest in more risky activities than 
otherwise and to increase the leveraged debt financing of their investment projects, but also 
to reduce the effort devoted to their productive activities. Thus, rural credit programs in 
developing countries will be characterized by excessive riskiness, excess demand for loans, 
and low borrower productive efforts. 
III. Empirical Test of the Valuwion Model 
The primary data utilized for valuing the implicit loan subsidy come from a sample 
of 2,204 credit dossiers of loans disbursed in 1987 by 18 branches of the Agricultural 
Development Bank of the Dominican Republic (BAGRICOLA). The data represent a 6 
percent of the total number of loans disbursed by the selected branches during that year. 
BAGRICOLA is an agricultural development institution oriented not only to lend to the 
agricultural sector of the Dominican Republic, but also to serve as a fundamental instrument 
of the Government's agrarian policies. As such, BAG RICO LA is provided by the Govern-
ment and international donors with funds to finance predetermined rural groups and/ or 
agricultural activities. Since different sources of funds impose different restrictions on loan 
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contract conditions, for the purposes of this paper, BAGRICOLA's different sources of 
funds have been classified into five categories4: 
(1) First, the bank's own resources (OWNR). The only restriction imposed on these 
funds is to finance agricultural activities in general. 
(2) Second, a credit line created with Government resources to finance the agricultural 
and livestock activities of agrarian reform beneficiaries (AGREF). 
(3) Third, international funds (World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank-IDB) 
oriented to finance specific agricultural activities (INTF). For instance, World Bank 
funds only finance coffee and cacao development projects. 
( 4) Fourth, Government and donor social funds (SOCF). These funds are not only 
oriented to finance small rural producers, but only some specific activities.5 
(5) Fifth, international non-targeted funds, provided by the Agency for International 
Development (USAID ). 
4 For details see Aguilera-Alfred et al. [1990]. 
5 These credit lines are designed more to satisfy political objectives than to accomplish 
production goals. For instance, in 1987 the Dominican Government designed a credit 
line to finance the purchase by poor farm-households of one pregnant sow, to initiate 
a small-scale swine breed that would allow them to improve their income. 
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TABLE 1 
SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE LOAN ACTIVITY OF THE 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
IN 1987, BY SOURCE OF FUNDS. 
SOURCE OF FUNDS AMOUNf DISBURSED AVERAGE REfURNOF AVERAGE LOAN 
DR PESOS PERCENTAGE LOAN INVESfMENf LOAN TERM DEFAULT1 
(000) (DR Pesos)2 (DR Pesos) (Months) (percentage) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OWN RESOURCES 4,499 49.4 5,690 17,172 22.29 11.4 
AGRARIAN REFORM 1,950 21.4 9,150 25,694 20.62 19.S 
INTERNATIONAL 1,082 11.9 9,020 59,125 28.70 40.4 
SOCIAL 1,261 13.8 1,230 6,208 25.76 49.3 
USAID 322 3.S 4,880 41,154 18.89 5.3 
Source: Sample of credit dossiers. 
Notes: 1. Loan default is defined as the percentage of the amount disbursed that was delinquent by the end of August of 
1989. 
2. Dominican Republic Pesos. 
As shown in Table 1, loans disbursed with the bank's own resources accounted for 
about one-half (49 percent) of the total amount disbursed in 1987, while Government-
sponsored funds (AGREF and SOCF) accounted for 35 percent of the total volume 
disbursed. Funds provided by international agencies (INTF and USAID funds), in turn, 
accounted only for 15 percent of the total amount lent. All loans were disbursed at a fixed 
annual rate of interest of 12 percent and more than 98 percent of them were granted with 
only the agricultural output (lien) as collateral. 
An important contrast stands out in Table 1, between the risk of default of loans 
disbursed from the more restrictive sources of funds and those granted from less restrictive 
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sources. The former consistently presented a higher risk of default. For instance, compare 
the 5 percent in the case of non-targeted funds provided by USAID, with 40 percent for the 
World Bank and IDB lines of credit. It has been shown elsewhere, that there is a causal 
connection between the restrictions imposed on the screening of borrowers by the targeting 
conditions of governments and donors and the risks of default (Aguilera, 1990). 
TABLE 2 
IMPLICIT AVERAGE LOAN SUBSIDY (FREE OPTION) 
RECEIVED BY THE SAMPLE OF BORROWERS OF THE BAGRICOLA IN 1987, 
BY SOURCE OF FUNDS. 
SOURCE OF FUNDS AVERAGE (DR PESOS) PROPORTION OF LOAN SUBSIDY 
SUBSIDY LOAN (1)/(2) 
(1) (2) (3) 
OWN RESOURCES 1,147 5,690 0.20 
AGRARIAN REFORM 2,014 9,150 0.22 
INTERNATIONAL 4,750 9,020 053 
SOCIAL 794 1,230 0.65 
USAID 840 4,880 0.17 
Source: Sample of credit dossiers. 
Since loans funded with OWNR and USAID funds impose less restrictions on the 
activities of the BAGRICOLA, the implicit subsidy provided by these sources should be 
lower than those provided by the more restrictive credit lines (INTF and SOCF). As shown 
in Table 2, the average implicit subsidy provided by loans funded with OWNR and USAID 
represented about one-fifth of the average amount lent (20 and 17 percent, respectively). 
On the other hand, the average implicit subsidy for the more restrictive sources of funds, 
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INTF and SOCF, represented more than one-half of the average volume lent (53 and 65 
percent, respectively). In other words, borrowers receiving INTF and SOCF loans implicitly 
received an average subsidy of DRS 520 and DRS 640 per each DRS 1,000 loan, while those 
that received OWNR and USAID loans obtained an average subsidy of only DRS 200 and 
DR$ 170. The surprising high average loan size and low average loan subsidy obtained by 
agrarian reform benficiaries are mainly explained by the bank's attempt to reduce lending 
costs and risks of default, by lending to associations of agrarian reform beneficiaries rather 
than to individual reform beneficiaries.6 
The implicit subsidy would have to be added to the interest rate subsidy that typically 
accompanies these loans, in order to measure the total transfer and its income distribution 
implications. Table 2 shows, however, that the largest average subsidy per borrower and the 
second-highest rate of subsidy are associated with the international (World Bank and IDB) 
sources of funds. Given the larger size of the beneficiaries of these programs, the subsidy 
appears to be regressive in its income distribution implications. 
6 In effect, as shown by Aguilera-Alfred et al., agrarian reform associations received 
an average loan size of more than DR$ 51,000, while agrarian reform individuals 
received an average loan size of only DRS 2,900. 
' . 
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